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IS ETHNICITY A BARRIER TO MIGRATION?: THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIENCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Yugoslavia is one country with two alphabets, three religions,
four languages, five nationalities, six republics, seven surrounding na-
tions,1 and countless interpretations about its middle-of-the-road way of
economic development. In the period since World War II it has changed from
a largely agricultural economically backward nation solidly embedded in the
Soviet Bloc to a rapidly developing economy with a substantial industrial
sector and a relatively independent place in the front ranks of the Third
World. This process of change has involved, among other things, a sub-
stantial migration movement within the country: at the time of the 1961
census, well over one-third of the population had migrated to their current
place of residence from another locality.
Was the economic dimension all that lay behind this large flow of
people, or was this flow in any way affected by the multi-ethnic character
of the nation alluded to in the opening sentence? A hypothesis that ethnic
differences constitute a barrier to migration can be found stated explicitly
in the literature, as for example:
*The work presented here is partly based on 0. Hawrylyshyn, "Patterns and
Determinants of Internal Migration in Yugoslavia" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972).
Alphabets: Latin and Cyrillic; religions: Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Mos-
lem; languages: Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian; nationalities:
Serb, Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, Montenegrin; republics: Serbia, Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Hercegovina; surrounding nations:
Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania.
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Even though the north is economically more attractive
than the south, ethnic, linguistic and other cultural
differences restrict many southern workers from seeking
jobs in the advanced north2
and
Because of (ethnic) differences migrations among regions
of different language are of a lesser intensity.3
This monograph attempts to analyze and test the "ethnic barriers"
hypothesis in the framework of a more comprehensive economic model of
migration movements, utilizing the methodology of statistical inference
from regression analysis. Before that is done, Section II provides a
brief background on the regional dimensions of Yugoslavia and Section III
presents a broad picture of the inter-regional migration patterns in the
postwar period. Section IV then presents the migration model and dis-
cusses the results of the statistical analysis. A summary of the con-
clusions is given in Section V.
2Jack C. Fisher, Yugoslavia-- A Multinational State (San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Co., 1956), p. 53.
3D. Breznik, Demografski i Ekonomski Aspekti Prostorne Pokretljivosti
Stanovnistva (Belgrade: SBPZ, 1968), p. 18.
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II. YUGOSLAVIA'S REGIONAL DIMENSIONS
While this is not the place for an extended treatment of the
multi-dimensional regionalization of Yugoslavia, a brief overview is
essential both to understand the content of the ensuing migration analysis,
and to comprehend its relevance in a broader socioeconomic perspective.
Table 1 presents a summary picture of the regional character of
Yugoslavia according to several classifications of important differentiat-
ing elements: ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural, historical, polit-
ical, and economic. The map of Yugoslavia in Figure 1 shows the republics
listed in the table; note that the Republic of Serbia includes two auton-
omous regions, Vojvodina in the north, and Kosovo-Metohija in the south,
and that this distinction is almost always made in any discussion of
regional divisions at the republic level.
We start from the northwest as do most visitors to Yugoslavia,
and enter Slovenia, the richest, most modern, and least-strange-to-western-
eyes region of Yugoslavia. The population of about 1.5 million is almost
entirely Slovene, speaks Slovene which is quite distinct from the offi-
cial Serbo-Croat, and writes this language in the Latin script in concor-
dance with their Catholic religion. Culturally, the western influence of
the Holy Roman and Austrian Empire has been quite thorough, at least in
terms of monopolizing the historical domination of this region until
World War I.
4Table 6 below indicates the majority ethnic group's population for each
of 20 so-called "demographic" regions of Yugoslavia.
Table i
REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF YUGOSLAVIA REPUBLIC CHARACTERISTICS
Elements of Differentiation
Cultural Historical
Religion Language Alphabet Background
Catholic Slovene Latin
Catholic Croatian Latin
Roman-
Western
Roman-
Western
Background
Austrian
Empire
Austrian
(some
Venetian)
Index of Per
Capita Income
(Yug = 100)
204
121
Bosnia-Hercegovina
Vojvodinaa
Central Serbiaa
Kosovoa
Montenegro
Macedonia
Croatian &
Serbian
Serbian
Serbian
Albanian
Montenegrin
Macedonian
Muslim, Serbo-
Catholic Croatian
Orthodox
Orthodox Serbian
Orthodox Serbian
Muslim
Orthodox
Latin
Cyrillic
Byzantine-
Turkish
Mixed
Cyrillic Byzantine-
Turkish
Albanian Latin
Serbian
Orthodox Macedonian
Byzantine-
Turkish
Cyrillic Byzantine-
Turkish
Cyrillic Byzantine-
Turkish
Ottoman
Mixed
Ottoman
Ottoman
Ottoman
Ottoman
aThe Republic of Serbia is usually thought of as being made up of its Central part and two autonomous units
indicated.
Republic
Slovenia
Croatia
Ethnicity
Slovene
Croatian
73
-I
103
100
34
66
57
A US T R IA
HUN GARY
I T A LY
F
YUGO
RUMANIA
N IA-
EGOVINA
A D R IA T I C
S E A
S E R B IA
a --
igure I
SLAVIA
Source: Joseph T. Bombel les, Economic Development of Communist Yugoslavia
(Stanford, Calif.; Hoover Insti t u
LGARIA
GR E E C E
t ion Publications , l968).
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The Republic of Croatia is a much larger territory with over
four million inhabitants. The territory is largely populated by Croats
with important concentrations of Serbs in the mountainous hinterlands of
the Dalmatian Coast and in the eastern plains, plus some Magyars (Hungarians)
in the Northeast (see Figure 2). The language is Croatian, which apart
from the use of the Latin alphabet, is distinct from Serbian in aspects
recognized easily only by natives and foreign linguists. Catholicism is
the religion of Croats who differ only slightly from the Slovenes in their
cultural background of Austrian-Western influences. The small differences
lie in the historical role of Venice in Dalmatian,5 and the "borderlands"
nature of much of the territory forming the fluid frontier between the Austrian
and Ottoman Empires. Also, the history of independent indigenous politics--
Croatian Kings of Middle Ages, Ragusa-- is considerably more important than
it is among the Slovenes.
The 3.5 million people of Bosnia-Hercegovina, somewhat more re-
mote in the highlands and plateaux of the central mountains, are roughly
evenly split between Serbian and Croatian in terms of ethnic division, when
by "ethnic" we mean something like "racial." The terms and their applica-
bility become most confused here because of the imposition of the category
"Muslim," which of course originates from the religious conversion during
the Ottoman rule. Today it is also used as an ethnic label. The Muslims
of Yugoslavia are not, in principle, Turks racially-- these are differen-
tiated quite apart as Figure 2 shows-- but whether they are Serbs or Croats
A half-kilo in Dalmatia is still "mezzo-kilo"; the main highway is the
"magistrala."
Figure 2
ETHNIC MAP OF YUGOSLAVIA
1948 DISTRIBUTION
Ioo 200 KM
Source : Fisher, YugoslOvia , p. 30.
0
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is either unknown or unimportant in the self-classification process. To
confound the statistician further, many Muslims respond "Yugoslav" to the
census questions on nationality. Precision on the language question is
best left to a linguist, but broadly, one finds Serbian, Croatian, and
Serbo-Croatian, the latter being an official Latin-script language only
slightly differentiable from Serbian and Croatian. Religion is basically
a three-way division: Catholic for Croatians, Orthodox for the Serbs, and
Muslim for the Muslims. The period of eastern influence here was quite
long and quite uninterrupted by Austrian incursions, which fact is manifest
in many ways besides the converted Muslim population. Economically this is
a poor republic with a few pockets of very recent industrialization based
on mineral exploitation and processing.
The Vojvodina (along with easternmost Croatia) is the fertile
breadbasket of Yugoslavia. The rich lands of the Pannonian Plain north of
the Sava-Danube line, provide a good economic life for the nearly two
million inhabitants, with a per capita income slightly above the Yugoslav
average. The majority of the people are Serbs and Orthodox with all that
entails for language and script, but there are significant minorities also:
Magyars, Croats, and small concentrations of Romanians, Slovaks, and
Ukrainians. Substantial migration since World War II has filled lands
left empty by Vojvodina-Germans with Montenegrins, Bosnians, and Macedon-
ians. Historically this area has been subject to a mixture of Austrian
and Ottoman influences, because of occupation by both Empires at different
times, important migration flows north across the frontier (the so-called
Precani-Serbs), and the trade and political contacts between the two
Empires in this area.
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Central Serbia, the cradle of the Serbian uprising against the
Turks in the early 19th century, is almost entirely populated by Serbs.
Its population of nearly five million speaks Serbian, is Orthodox in
affiliation, uses the Cyrillic script. The capital city of Belgrade is
situated here, and the postwar industrial expansion here and in one or two
other small centers (Nis, Kragujevac) accounts for the income level reach-
ing the Yugoslav average in this territory. The cultural influence is
strongly eastern: Byzantine in an early period, Turkish a little later,
corresponding to the historical domination. As in Croatia, there is never-
theless a very strong historical tradition of indigenous political-states
in the Middle Ages, even though the center of this Kingdom was in territory
presently inhabited by ethnic Albanians (Pec in Kosovo).
The one million population in the Kosovo is about two-thirds
6
Albanian (Siptar), Muslim, speaking Albanian as a mother tongue which is
quite unrelated to any of Yugoslavia's Slavic languages. Ottoman influence
was most strongly imposed here, the domination lasting over half a millen-
nium. This is by far the poorest, least developed economic region.
Montenegro is a small "mountain-state" of a half-million popula-
tion, almost entirely "Montenegrin," a self-determined ethnic category
which manifests less a racial difference relative to their closest
"brothers" the Serbs, but is to be understood more as a statement of his-
torical pride. The distinction arises from the Montenegrins' perseverance
against the Ottoman occupants, who rarely penetrated the aerie-like empire
of the Bishop-Kings of Montenegro. Not surprisingly, this is an under-
6The Albanians have recently required important linguistic rights in the
Kosovo system of administration and education.
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developed region with per capita income in 1962 about two-thirds of the
Yugoslav average.
Lastly, in the southeast corner of Yugoslavia is the Republic of
Macedonia. Though Orthodox and using the Cyrillic script as the Serbs,
Macedonians-- a large majority of the population-- speak a distinct lan-
guage and consider themselves racially different from the other South Slavs.
The existence of a separate language, polity, and national recognition is
very new for Macedonians, and it is still not entirely uncontested. The
1.5 million inhabitants of Macedonia are among the poorest in Yugoslavia,
with little fertile land and limited industry.
In brief, the regional picture in Yugoslavia can be painted as
follows: as one goes from northwest to southeast, one encounters less
Latin, more Cyrillic, less Catholic, more Orthodox and some Moslem, less
western and more eastern influences, and finally progressively less modern-
ization, industry, and greater poverty.
The above gives an historical outline and a view of the picture
of the situation at about 1960 relative economic positions; it is also
useful to indicate briefly the patterns of economic growth and industrial-
ization in the postwar period.
Table 2 gives an indication of regional differences in develop-
ment since 1947, exhibiting a widening of the differentials at least until
1962. In the period from the war to 1962 only Bosnia-Hercegovina exper-
I have in mind Bulgarian claims with respect to language, and to some
degree ethnicity and territory. For an excellent exposition, see Paul
Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1968).
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Table 2
INDEX OF RELATIVE PER CAPITA INCOME OF YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS
(1960 prices; selected years 1947-1968;
Yugoslav average = 100)
1947 1952 1957 1962 1968
Yugoslavia 100 100 100 100 100
Bosnia-Hercegovina 84 88 74 73 69
Montenegro 71 65 65 66 76
Croatia 103 109 120 121 127
Macedonia 62 59 61 57 66
Slovenia 165 188 182 204 198
Serbia: (Total) 94 87 92 90 88
Vojvodina 105 90 109 103 103
Kosovo 52 50 42 34 36
Source: 1947-1962: Computed from: Jugoslavija, Savezni Zavod za Statistiku,
Jugoslavija Statisticki Pregled (Belgrade, 1965), p. 89.
1968: Computed from: Jugoslavija, SZS, Statisticki Godisnjak
(Belgrade, 1970), p. 322, 351.
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ienced a short-lived narrowing of the gap; from then it fell back just as
did the other underdeveloped regions (Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo) through-
out the period. It was only after 1962 that some narrowing once again
occurred, although this was essentially limited to Montenegro and Macedonia,
as the relative decline at the top for Slovenia (to 198 from 204) and the
relative increase at the bottom for the Kosmet (to 36 from 34) were more
in the nature of a "leveling off" of the earlier widening trend.
It is important, however, not to be completely misled by the rel-
ative rates of development, for it cannot be said that this apparent fail-
ure to close the gap manifests continued stagnation in the less developed
areas or the lack of attempts to bring some development to these areas.
The picture is rather different, and the only justifiable conclusions
possible are that (a) not enough redirection of development efforts to
less developed areas occurred in this period to achieve a narrowing; and/or
(b) not enough time has elapsed to reap the full benefits of development
efforts in the less developed areas.
The lack of convergence cannot be attributed to economic stag-
nation in the less developed republics, for as evidenced by Table 3 the
growth of aggregate national income was by no means low, and, in fact, for
three of the four underdeveloped regions was above the national average in
most of the period 1952-1966. It should be emphasized, however, that
prior to 1962 the growth rates for these regions were in general lower
or only slightly higher than the national average.
In conclusion, the postwar evolution of the economy has not left
the poorer Center and South unaffected; in fact significant industrial-
ization has occurred, but on the other hand the traditionally richer
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Table 3
GROWTH OF NATIONAL INCOME IN YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS
(1952-1966)
Annual Rate
Yugoslavia
Bosnia-Hercegovina
Montenegro
Croatia
Macedonia
Slovenia
Serbia (Total)
Vojvodina
Kosovo
1952-1957
(%)
10.4
7.6
10.9
10.7
11.1
9.2
11.8
14.8
7.9
1957-1962
(%)
7.0
7.4
8.2
6.8
5.7
8.6
6.5
5.6
4.1
Source: Calculated from data in Jugoslavija, 1965, p. 89.
1962-1966
(%)
9.0
9.2
13.0
8.6
13.0
7.4
9.5
9.5
13.9
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North and West have advanced equally rapidly, keeping the relative gap as
wide as it ever was. Thus, though new economic opportunities have been
created for the population of underdeveloped areas, the attraction of the
old, rich, developed centers has by no means been diminished.
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III. INTER-REPUBLICAN MIGRATION FLOWS
At the time of the 1961 Census over one-third of the population
of Yugoslavia had moved to its place of residence8 from a different local-
ity, although it must be said that half of these moves involved distances
less than 50 kilometers. Over time, mobility has apparently increased. In
1931 the number of people who had moved to the then place of residence was
about one-fifth.9 This figure has been increasing within the postwar
period. Of the 37.1% of the 1961 population that was not native to the
1961 place of residence, 7.7% had settled there in the 7-year period
1946-1952, 7.8% in the 5-year period 1953-1957, and 8.4% in the 34-year
period 1958-1961.10
Table 4 provides an insight into the importance of across-republic
flows in this important exchange of populations. To clarify the meaning of
the data consider Bosnia: column one states that 24.0% of the 1961 popula-
tion had migrated to their current place of residence from somewhere within
the republic, while another 3.4% had migrated in from outside the republic.
The first column values may be considered a crude approximation
of the "mobility" of the population native to the given republic.11 From
8Place of residence (mesto stalnog boravka) is defined as a settlement, a
very small unit within a commune, which itself is part of a "srez" or prov-
ince, a number of the latter making up a republic. As a settlement may be
urban or rural, population sizes vary from a few hundred to several thousand.
9 VM. Sentid, "Znacaj Cvijieevog Rada za Savremena Istrazivanja Migracije,"
Stanovnistvo, 4(1965), p. 241.
101961 Census of Yugoslavia, Book 12, p. xliv.
The greatest shortcoming of this approximation is the exclusion of the
"native" population that migrated to another republic.
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Table 4
MIGRATION WITHIN AND BETWEEN REPUBLICS
(1)
Intra-Republic,
Migration as
Percent of 1961
Population
(%)
(2)
Inter-Republic
Migration as
Percent of 1961
Population
(%)
Bosnia-Hercegovina
Montenegro
Croatia
Macedonia
Slovenia
Central Serbia
Vojvodina
Kosovo
24.0
28.2
32.6
27.5
41.7
29.1
23.7
27.0
3.4
5.8
5.9
4.8
3.8
7.8
2.2
Source: Computed from data in Breznik, Demografski i Ekonomski Aspekti, pp. 35-36.
a25 0 ,0 0 0 migrants under official land resettlement schemes in empty German
lands in the Vojvodina are excluded from this calculation.
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this it can be seen that the richer republics have generally more popula-
tions: the highest figures occur in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. The
only surprise is the low figure for the Vojvodina.
The picture is, however, very different for inter-republic mi-
gration: one might expect that the richest republics would draw consider-
able migration from the poorer ones, and hence that the proportion of the
1961 population which came from outside the republic would be highest for
the richest republics. Clearly column 2 values do not fit this pattern;
the highest values occur for Central Serbia and the Vojvodina while the
lowest are for the Kosovo, Bosnia, and Slovenia! The surprises are that
Slovenia and Croatia are as low as shown, while Montenegro is as high.
The latter can perhaps be explained by the very rapid forced industrial-
ization through "political" factories,12 but it is less clear what ex-
plains the fact that "there is less inter-republic migration than might be
considered normal,"13 particularly as concerns the flow one would expect
into the rich North, Croatia and Slovenia.
The data of Table 5 show in greater detail the pattern of inter-
republic migration; the numbers are net (in-migrants less out-migrants)
and are best read down a column; a positive value signifies a net gain, a
negative value a net loss. At the level of republics, only Serbia (in-
cluding the autonomous regions) is a net gainer, Slovenia has a zero
balance, and Croatia a negative balance, which is not however very
1 2See, for example, the description in Fisher, Yugoslavia, p. 6.
1 3Ibid., p. 53.
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Table 5
NET BALANCE OF INTER-REPUBLIC MIGRANTS
(1961, '000)
Republic of 1961 Residence
Republic of Origin
Bosnia-Hercegovina
B & H CR MAC MON
- +89
SL SER
0 -8 +5 +173
- -3 -5 0 +143
Macedonia
Montenegro
0 +3
+8
-5Slovenia
- -3 +1
+5 +3
0 -1 0
+ 5
- 0 + 58
- + 6
Serbia (total)
1961 balance
1961 balance as %
of 1961 population
-173 -143
-259
8.0
-46
1.1
-5 -58
-6 -74
0.4 15.7
-6
0 +385
5.0
Source: Computed from data in Breznik, Dusan, "Internal Population Migrations
in Yugoslavia," Yugoslav Survey, 9:2 (May 1968), pp. 1-10.
Croatia -89
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significant relative to the size of the base population (1% as shown in
Table 5). Similarly, Macedonia has a very small negative balance. The
big losers, both in absolute and in relative terms, are clearly Bosnia-
Hercegovina and Montenegro.
The surprising facts are the nongainer status of Croatia and
Slovenia, supporting the evidence of Table 4. The pattern is not quite
the Southeast to Northwest flow one would expect on the basis of relative
economic status. People are migrating from the poorer regions, but not
toward the richest areas, rather toward the Northeast toward Serbia. The
only significant net gain for either Croatia or Slovenia is from Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
Broad generalizations about migration patterns expected, given
the regional pattern of national income levels, do not appear to be correct.
The North and West of the country appear to be overlooked by migrants de-
spite their level of economic development.
Why is this so? Does the economic analysis fail at this point?
Is it necessary to consider the possiblility of noneconomic barriers? It
is certainly an attractive possibility, if one recalls the historical-
cultural-religious-ethnic factors so important in the Yugoslav mosaic de-
scribed earlier. Much of that fits very well as an explanation for a
"barrier" between the Northwest (Croatia and Slovenia) and the rest of the
country. This is, of course, the old dividing line between east and west
in Yugoslav history: it separates religions, languages, cultures, and, to
an extent, ethnic groups. The Macedonians are quite apart east of this line
and their near-zero balance of Table 5 is thus easily explained; the large
net flow from Bosnia-Hercegovina to Croatia, might it not be largely a flow
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of Croats who make up about a fifth of the population of Bosnia and
Hercegovina?14 As for the rest, this is largely made up of Serbs and their
very close ethnic brothers, the Montenegrins; it is precisely among the
regions comprising this latter group that one finds very substantial trans-
fers of population toward the richest of them, Serbia. 15
As appealing as these explanations seem they are not entirely
convincing, because there are a number of factors on the economic side not
yet considered. The economic literature on migration theory has recognized
that the level of economic development is not by itself a complete descrip-
tion of what motivates migration: one must consider costs of transfers,
availability of opportunities, the spread of information about these oppor-
tunities, and people's expectations about the economic advantage of migra-
tion.16 In terms of the issue at hand, these considerations bring forth
several questions as yet unanswered; for example:
Transfer Costs:
Most of the poor regions are much farther from Slovenia
than from Central Serbia; perhaps the costs manifested by
1 4Consider the following: On Figure 3, region 18, Hercegovina in the
southwest of Yugoslavia has a majority of Croatians; of its out-migrants,
22% went to Central and Eastern Croatia. On the other hand, region 14,
Northwest Bosnia, which bounds on Central Croatia, sent only 18% of its
out-migrants to the same two regions. Northwest Bosnia's population is
60% Serb.
15
In effect toward Central Serbia and Vojvodina, as other evidence clearly
shows that the Kosovo is a net loser. See Hawrylyshyn, "Patterns and
Determinants of Internal Migration in Yugoslavia," pp. 37 ff.
1 6For a brief overview of economic theories of migration see Chapter 2 in
Hawrylyshyn, ibid.
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this distance explain some of the smaller flow there.
After all, Macedonia which is also more isolated in the
southeast has essentially a similar migration balance!
Availability of Opportunities:
True, income in Slovenia or Croatia is higher than in
Serbia, but more new opportunities have been created in
the latter as suggested by higher growth rates of
industry.
All this is not to say that the historical, cultural, and ethnic
factors are unimportant, that a more sophisticated economic analysis will
give all the answers. Rather, the implication is that all these elements
combine to explain the patterns of migration. It is in this spirit of a
more comprehensive framework of analysis that SectionIV attempts to gain
insight into the role played by the ethnic factor.
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IV. A MODEL OF MIGRATION INCLUDING THE ETHNIC FACTOR
In this section an attempt is made to test explicitly for the
importance of the ethnic composition of a region, using multiple regres-
sion analysis "explaining" migration flows by a number of other measurable
factors, among them the ethnic composition of a given population. This
methodology of inference from statistical significance is clearly different
from what appear on the surface to be more direct techniques such as asking
people if they consider ethnic factors in migration decisions. The results
should thus be acceptable to the degree that the reader is comfortable with
the methodology.
The model used is of the "push-pull" variety17 stated in the
form of a single equation explaining out-migration from a given region of
origin, to all other regions (j)in the country, specifically:
OMR. = a + b-D. + c-UR; + d'YP- + e-LF- + f'EA- (1)
J JJJJ
where OMR = out-migration from the given region to region j(OMg)
divided by the 1961 population in region (Pj)
D. = distance from given region to region j.
17
For examples of similar models of place-to-place flows, see I.S. Lowry,
Migration and Metropolitan Growth: Two Analytical Models (San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Co., 1966); R.L. Raimon, "Interstate Migration and
Wage Theory," Review of Economics and Statistics, 44:4(November 1962),
pp. 428-438; M.J. Greenwood, "An Analysis of the Determinants of Geographic
Labor Mobility in the United States," Review of Economics and Statistics,
51:2 (May 1969), pp. 189-194; R.E. Beals, M.B. Levy, and L.M. Mosea,
"Rationality and Migration in Ghana," Review of Economics and Statistics,
49:4 (November 1967), pp. 480-486.
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UR. = percent of 1961 population of j in urban areas.
J
YP = per capita national income of j in 1961.J
LF = labor force participation rate in j, 1961.J
EA. = percentage of j's population that is of the same
ethnic group as the majority ethnic group in the
given region of origin; this is called the "ethnic
affinity" variable.
a, b, = coefficient values
c, d,
e, f
For this analysis, the country is broken up into 20 so-called
Demographic Regions, as shown in Figure 3. The delineation of the regions
is from a Yugoslav study18 which divided the country first into 20, then
into 79 relatively homogeneous units to be used for economic-demographic
analysis. The units themselves are not administrative units, though, of
course to allow data collection, they are comprised of components that are
administrative (communes).
Such a division gives sufficient degrees of freedom in econometric
analysis to permit statistical estimation of equation (1) for each region,
as there are 19 observations for each region. Thus 20 regressions are done..
Prior to discussion of results, a brief explanation of the vari-
ables in the model is in order. The dependent variable to be explained is
not ideal according to push-pull theory which speaks of a flow of migrants
over a specific period of time. One is, however, forced to use the stock
18
Institut Druntvenih Nauka, Sema Stalnih Rejona za Demografska
Istraizivanja (Belgrade, 1967).
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Fig 3
DEMOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF YUGOSLAVIA
V
Su m a d i ja
Old Serbia
Eastern Serbia
Southern Serbia
Kosmet
Eastern Vojvodina
Western Vojvodina
Eastern Croatia
Central Croatia
Northern Dalmatia
1 1.
12.
13.
14.
15.
1 6.
17.
1 8.
19.
20.
Southern Dalmatia
Western Slovenia
Eastern Slovenia
Northwest Bosnia
Northeast Bosnia
Central Bosn ia
Eastern Bosnia
Hercegovina
Macedonia
Montenegro
Source: Breznik , Demografski i Economski Aspekti, p. 127.
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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of migrants in j from the region in question. This is not of course un-
usual in migration studies, where the availability of flow data is the ex-
ception and not the norm. Also, it is clear in the Yugoslav case that the
rate of migration has been accelerating in the postwar period (see p. 15),
hence there is good reason to accept the 1961 stock as a very good proxy
for recent flows. The division of absolute numbers of migrants by the
population of the receiving region is not simply a matter of normalizing
for scale; one should in fact argue that greater P reflects greater
numbers of opportunities for potential migrants, other attractiveness
factors being equal.1 9
Distance acts as a proxy for the transfer costs involved, which
includes more than simply transport: the cost of keeping in touch with
home is increased as the distances increase. In estimating distances in
road-kilometers between two regions, a point in each had to be chosen.
The geographic center is often a poor choice because of heterogeneous
spatial distribution of the population, thus a more appropriate choice
would be what I call a "population center of gravity." For this study I
used a rough procedure of estimating "by eye" such a center of gravity on
the basis of detailed population density maps.20 Since this is a cost
element, one expects the econometric estimates to yield negative signs
for the coefficient b.
1 9In gravity-model terms the dependent variable might be M,, and Pj would
be an independent variable; thus the implicit assumption behind the
division is that the coefficient of Pj in the latter formulation is 1.
This hypothesis was tested with very satisfactory results.
2 0Institut Drustvenih Nauka, Sema Stalnih Rejona.
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The urbanization variable reflects the attractiveness of a region
in two respects: the greater opportunities for modern, industrial, or
service jobs in urban centers, and the attractiveness of urban centers for
consumption opportunities: schools, health care, entertainment, etc. Note
that in Yugoslavia the definition of urban depends on both size and percent
of population in nonagricultural activities, thus small industrial com-
munities (or bedroom communities) are urban, and very large agricultural
settlements are not. This makes the measure a better proxy for industrial-
modern job opportunities than would be the case in countries with a more
usual, simple size definition. As this is a positive attractive force,
one expects positive values for the c coefficients.
Per capita national income in 1961 is a proxy for unavailable
average wages in the migration model and is thus considered to reflect the
attraction of opportunities for higher earnings. In a short-run model or
one that looked at time-series migration, average wages in industry would
be preferable. But even with such a model, wages might not be as good a
measure of economic attractiveness in Yugoslavia because of the relatively
high public consumption element in the economy. Furthermore, the correla-
tion between average wages and per capita income is likely to be higher in
a socialist economy with a small nonwage income component. Given this,
plus the fact that the lack of flow data forces the use of migrant stock
and makes the model a long-run one, the use of per capita income rather
than earnings does not seem to be inappropriate. Again, this variable is
a positive attribute and the coefficient values should therefore be
positive.
Labor force participation rates were intended to manifest the
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degree of development of a modern labor market;21 however, it in fact
captured a quite different effect in a limited number of cases, namely the
important flows from poor agricultural lands in the center and south to
the newly emptied fertile Pannonia Plain. This will be explained in dis-
cussing the statistical results.
The ethnic affinity variable is much more complex than the
others both in its theoretical role in the model and in the procedures
for measurement, but the effort in dealing with the greater complexity is
very rewarding for what it may tell us is of much greater interest testing
the hypothesis that ethnic differences constitute a barrier to migration.
The effect in question is clearly akin to the"linkages" effects
of Nelson,22 whose "Friends and Relatives Multiplier" explains that mi-
gration from i to j is greater the larger is the stock in j of former
migrants from i because of (1) increased information flow, (2) easier
adjustment and (3) social attractiveness of a milieu where one is not a
complete stranger but already has friends or relatives. The Ethnic Affinity
Coefficient in this analysis acts in a way similar to (3), that is, of all
possible destinations for a potential migrant from i, the most attractive--
ceteris paribus-- is that in which the cultural, linguistic, religious, and
habitudinal characteristics of the populace are most akin to his own. This
is strongly correlated to the degree of ethnic similarity of i and j.
2 1See V. Renshaw, "The Role of Migration in Labor Market Adjustment" (Ph.D.
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1970), for a
discussion of the role of development of labor markets in explaining
migration flows.
2 2See P. Nelson, "Migration, Real Income & Information," Journal of Regional
Science, 1:2(Spring 1959), pp. 43-74.
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The problem is how to measure this.
We begin by labeling each region as to its ethnic association,
according to the majority group: the classification is shown in Table 6.
The great homogeneity of the regions makes this an acceptable procedure
for all except three of four regions. In one case, Central Bosnia, there
is a plurality of Muslims. Three other areas in Bosnia have majorities
of about 50% of a given group while the remaining 16 are 60% or better.
It will not be surprising then to find the results of the statistical
analysis less conclusive for the Bosnian regions in question. Then taking
a region i, given its ethnicity (E ) I define the ethnic affinity of
another region j to people in i as the percentage of j's population
made up by people of ethnic origin E.. Thus for region 1, a Serbian
region, the ethnic affinity of 20 is the percent of Serbs in 20's popula-
tion, the ethnic affinity of 19 is the percent of Serbs in 19's population,
etc.
For the individual in i measuring the attractiveness of j, the
attribute that is in question is the ethnocultural climate in j: how
large is the group of his ethnicity, what opportunities are there for
schooling, religious affiliation, personal contacts within a group of his
own ethnic background, community associations, etc. The individual in i
may pose a different question about the ethnocultural profile of j;
"what is the major ethnic group in j, if it is not my own?" The measure
in this study in no way reflects any such factors. Nor does it reflect
the third type of ethnic effect, a push from within i: for an individual
in i of a minority group, does the ethnicity of the majority in i have
any effect on his migration? All this is not to state which of these
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Table 6
Region
ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC REGIONS
1961
Major Ethnic Group
Serbian
Serbian
Serbian
Serbian
Siptar (Albanian)
Serbian
Serbian
Croatian
Croatian
Croatian
Croatian
Slovenian
Slovenian
Serbian
Serbian
Moslem
Serbian
Croatian
Macedonian
Montenegrin
Source: Jugoslavija, SZS, Popis Stanovnistva 1961, Book VI, pp. 301-303.
Percentage
of Population
(%)
93.2
89.9
98.0
89.8
67.1
64.7
49.6
69.7
86.0
75.3
83.8
95.2
96.2
59.9
50.8
31.3
49.6
50.9
70.9
81.5
-30-
effects are or are not present in Yugoslavia, but simply to specify clearly
that the measure used in this study is intended to reflect only the positive
attractive force of a like ethnic group in the potential destinations of a
migrant. Thus it acts in much the same way as do better income, better
job opportunities, better urban amenities.
"All other things equal-- economic attractiveness equal-- is a
place more attractive because it has relatively more people of my ethnic
group?" This is a question a prospective migrant may pose; the current
study attempts to find evidence of such behavior underlying migration move-
ments using the measure of ethnic affinity outlined above.
RESULTS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
As stated earlier, it is necessary to analyze the effect of
ethnic factors in migration as one element among several that have an in-
fluence. For this reason, in discussing the results I will attempt to say
a little about the "economic" factors (D, UR, YP, LF) not concentrating
only on the ethnic affinity variable.
Table 7 presents the results of the regression analysis. The
explanatory power of the variables is overall quite high as judged by the
-2values of R and the F-test of the significance of the overall fit. High
-2R does not of itself mean a good estimation of course; thus it is grati-
fying to note that the fit of the individual variables is also quite good
in the sense of being fairly consistent with respect to sign, value, and
significance. That this is so should become clear in the discussion of
the individual variable results which follows.
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Table 7
OUT-MIGRATION REGRESSION RESULTS BY REGION
(Log-Linear Form)
Coefficient and (t) Values for Variables
D EA UR
-2
YP LF R
1. Central Serbia
2. Old Serbia
3. Eastern Serbia
4. Southern Serbia
5. Kosmet
6. Eastern Vojvodina
7. Western Vojvodina
8. Eastern Croatia
9. Central Croatia
10. Northern Dalmatia
11. Southern Dalmatia
12. Western Slovenia
13. Eastern Slovenia
-0.96 0.18 0.53 0.63
(-5.10) (2.27) (2.25) (2.57)
-2.44 0.08 0.58 0.70
(-9.15) (0.99) (1.83) (1.84)
-1.65 0.02 0.83 0.26
(-6.78) (0.16) (2.69) (0.86)
-2.40 0.15 1.40 0.51
(-8.51) (1.67) (3.84) (1.18)
-1.84 -0.03 1.45 -0.35
(-6.02) (-0.32) (3.39) (-0.74)
-1.05 0.27 0.53 0.67
(-2.29) (1.62) (1.09) (1.36)
-1.16 0.15 1.35 -0.05
(-2.89) (1.10) (3.43) (-0.13)
(F)
- .8565
- (20.9)
- .9082
- (34.6)
- .8729
- (31.9)
- .9207
- (40.6)
- .8953
- (29.9)
- .6894
- (7.7)
- .7520
- (10.6)
-0.95 0.33 1.03 0.05 1.65 .9140
(-3.22) (5.19) (3.48) (0.14) (1.70) (27.6)
-0.85 0.19 0.97 0.73
(-1.69) (1.94) (1.69) (1.11)
-0.49 0.26 1.68 0.47
(-0.66) (2.04) (2.23) (0.49)
-0.03 0.47 0.92 0.40
(0.04) (3.53) (1.59) (0.85)
-0.54 0.34 0.21 0.82
(-1.87) (2.81) (0.65) (1.57)
-0.51 0.48 0.32 0.77
(-3.58) (6.54) (1.95) (2.70)
- .7801
- (12.4)
- .7526
- (10.6)
- .8092
- (14.8)
- .9282
- (45.2)
- .9868
- (260.9)
Region
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Table 7 (Cont'd)
D EA
14. Northwest Bosnia
15. Northeast Bosnia
16. Central Bosnia
17. Eastern Bosnia
(F)
-1.56 0.50 1.00 0.93 -3.83 .7636
(-3.12) (3.08) (1.69) (1.07) (-2.20) (8.4)
-2.27 0.22 0.46 0.83 -3.90 .8280
(-4.85) (1.23) (0.86) (1.04) (-2.16) (12.5)
-2.10 0.14 0.82 0.57
(-7.43) (2.25) (2.76) (2.11)
- .9004
- (31.7)
-1.93 0.40 0.35 1.23 -4.73 .7637
(-3.22) (1.95) (0.44) (1.42) (-2.02) (8.4)
18. Hercegovina
19. Macedonia
20. Montenegro
-1.66 0.24 1.38 -1.20
(-2.04) (1.43) (1.79) (-1.69)
- .5993
- (5.2)
-0.93 0.51 0.82 -0.35 1.61 .9568
(-5.20) (6.08) (3.31) (-1.30) (3.31) (57.5)
-1.21 0.41 0.41 0.45 -1.83 .8059
(-3.06) (3.14) (1.23) (1.08) (-1.98) (15.9)
N.B. A t-statistic that is much lower than 2 indicates the coefficient
estimate is not statistically significant. Precise statistical test
values depend on the degree of significance one has in mind (1%, 5%).
Region UR YP LF -2R
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The variable D has a negative coefficient in all cases, as
expected, and is furthermore very significant as shown by the high t-values.
It is important to note that the two cases where the coefficient for dis-
tance is not significant are two very similar regions, the Northern and
Southern parts of the Adriatic coast including the hinterland. This part
of the country had until recently very poor transportation connections to
the rest of Yugoslavia, hence out-migration to even the nearer attractive
regions meant a great deal of travel, so that the incremental distances
beyond this were not much of an additional hindrance. Furthermore, the
most likely connection with practically all inland regions was in this
earlier period along the coast to Rijeka and from there through Central
Croatia to other inland regions, while the road distance measures I used
were for the newer much improved routes across the central mountain ranges,
which are today in fact used considerably more than before. Since these
routes provide much shorter connections to the inland regions, they in fact
underestimated the effective frictional distance for out-migrants of the
period before 1961. With this in mind it appears correct to conclude that
the role of distance in explaining migration is as important in Yugoslavia
as has been found in other migration studies.
Coefficients for the variable UR = % of urban population are all
of the expected positive sign, and a majority of them are significant.
With the exception of Western Slovenia, the nonsignificant cases appear to
be regions in which much of the out-migration was not of the rural-urban
type, but rural-rural migration from worse to better agricultural lands, a
migration stream that was still of considerable importance in Yugoslavia up
to 1961. This was especially true for the mountainous, barren regions of
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Northeast Bosnia, Eastern Bosnia, and Montenegro from which out-migrants
went to the fertile lands of the Danubian Plain, especially to eastern
Vojvodina and Eastern Crotia. Out-migration from these infertile areas
was highest to fertile lands with median-level UR, was lower to more indus-
trial areas with high UR (that is, there was some industrializing-urbanizing
migration) and lowest to other poor, low UR regions. Thus, there was both
a positive and a negative effect of UR on migration, and it is not surpris-
ing that the coefficients have poor statistical fit. This is, of course,
as it should be because it brings to light the fact that not all of the out-
migration from poorer regions was urbanizing, industrially related, but that
there was an important flow from traditional agriculture on very poor
lands to empty places left in better lands by city-bound migrants. This
flow was also greatly increased by the colonization of lands left empty by
expatriation of Vojvodina Germans after the war.
Table 7 clearly shows the statistical unimportance and inconsis-
tent explanatory power of the variable YP = income per capita. This
appears at first surprising, particularly for a model that is long-run,
that the basic economic attractiveness of higher income should turn out to
be unimportant in the migration decision. However, this conclusion is not
warranted because there exists a problem of collinearity between UR and
YP which makes it impossible to separate the different effects of the two
variables. That is, UR and YP are highly correlated (r 2 = .65) and the
effects of YP are largely captured by the coefficient of the UR vari-
able in statistical analysis. The dominance of UR should not be inter-
preted to say that YP may be dropped from the equation, for this does
not solve the collinearity problem, and to the extent that YP does express
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some unique effect in the migration process it would be wrong to leave
it out. Empirically, the effect of leaving out YP is to increase the
significance and coefficient of the UR variable, but with a resultant
worsening in the fit of the equations and the estimates of the other vari-
ables in many cases. That YP should be a part of the equation capturing
some effect (even though not reflected in its coefficient or t-value) is
pointed out clearly in the case of the regions where agricultural-oriented
migrations are known to be important. As discussed above, for these re-
gions the urbanization variable should not be as important; when YP is
left out of the regression for Northwest Bosnia, Northeast Bosnia, Eastern
Bosnia, and Montenegro, and UR variable increases in significance indica-
ting that some of the effect of higher income in the better agricultural
lands is captured by the UR variable.
Although it is not econometrically valid in the case of collin-
earity to "prove" the significance of YP by showing it becomes significant
and correct when UR is left out-- because leaving it out misspecifies the
equation and biases the coefficient estimates-- the consistency of the re-
sults of such an exercise is too appealing intuitively to disregard. This
"seat-of-the-pants" econometrics indicates the YP by itself is highly sig-
nificant in only three, while its sign is positive in 19 cases.
The upshot of all this appears to be that the difficulty in esti-
mating a coefficient for YP is a result of collinearity with UR, but that
YP does in fact belong in the specification of the equation, and is exerting
some effect on the regression even though the effect cannot be untangled
from that expressed by the urbanization variable.
The variable LF (= labor force participation rate) was of some
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importance in six cases, four of these having a negative sign and the
other two a positive one. The four negative cases are Northwest Bosnia,
Northeast Bosnia, Eastern Bosnia, and Montenegro. For the other 14 re-
gions, LF was excluded because neither an empirical nor a theoretical
justification existed for its inclusion.
It is not a coincidence that these regions also were exceptional
in having UR not significant; this suggests that the statistical impor-
tance of LF had something to do with the distinction between rural-urban
and rural-rural moves. In fact, a close look at the data for the above
four regions makes it clear that the variable was acting to isolate the
areas of agricultural out-migration. The four regions in question all had
low values for LF: by far the greatest number of migrants from these re-
gions went to the three regions of good agricultural lands, which had
medium level values for LF, while much smaller numbers went to regions
with high LF. Thus, high migration (agricultural) was associated with
median participation rates (in fertile areas) while lower migration
(industrial) was associated with high participation rates (in industrial-
ized areas). The result is the negative correlation as found. It must be
emphasized that the coefficient of LF does not reflect a theoretical
importance of labor force participation rates as a direct instrumental
factor in the migration decision; rather the LF is a proxy for the
attractiveness of relatively empty fertile agricultural lands to people in
the poorest nonindustrial areas of South and Central Yugoslavia.
The next variable EA, ethnic affinity, sets the Yugoslav case
quite apart from others, for in it we find a unique and important aspect
of the migration decision: the role of ethnic kinship as a positive
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attractive force. Consistent positive values and a high degree of signifi-
cance for the coefficient in a majority of cases, suggest very strongly
that the hypothesis stated on p._27 should be accepted: for a given origin,
the higher the percentage of that origin's ethnic group in a destination,
the greater will be the migration to that destination, ceteris paribus.
Clearly, the results suggest that people do consider the attractiveness of
a region to involve not only economic factors but, in addition to this, the
ethnic affinity to that region.
As indicated earlier, the variable does not test directly the
elements of the "barrier" hypothesis concerning ethnic groups other than
one's own pushing migrants out or repelling them from certain possible
destinations. However, the significance of EA does mean that migration
may be somewhat less than it would be if people did not consider the
strength of their group's ethnic milieu in their evaluation of relative
attractiveness of different regions. If this factor were irrelevant, then
some of the people who did not migrate would find that the attractiveness
of some region outside their own would be greater than that of their own
and would migrate. Also, there may have been migrants from i to j who
in fact considered another region k to be slightly more attractive
economically (perhaps only because of shorter distance to k) but j's
ethnic affinity was enough to compensate. If ethnic factors were irrele-
vant, these people would have gone to k instead.23 In these two senses,
the significance of the ethnic affinity factor may be said to manifest the
occurrence of some limited form of "barrier" to interregional migration
in Yugoslavia.
There is no reason to suppose that the ethnic affinity factor
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should be equally important for all ethnic groups or regions, nor even
that it should in fact be important for all groups. Hence it is instruc-
tive to look in more detail at the value and significance of the coeffic-
ient for the different regions. First of all it should not be surprising
to anyone who is familiar with the nationalities in Yugoslavia that the
coefficient for the Kosmet is not of the right sign and is quite insignif-
icant. The population here was two-thirds Viptar in 1961, and the Siptars
(Albanians) are undoubtedly furthest removed from all other nationalities
in terms of language and culture-- a somewhat similar conclusion about the
ethnic distance of Siptars is reached in a Yugoslav study of ethnic dis-
tance.24 Thus, it is also conceivable that they may be quite indifferent
in choosing among regions in which other groups predominate and in which
their numbers are extremely small. Much of this migration is of unskilled
labor to large cities-- particularly Belgrade-- as suggested by the very
high and significant value for the UR coefficient. To the large segment
of the Kosmet population that is relatively unskilled, the great attrac-
tiveness of large cities is in the fact that the opportunities for peri-
pheral (often temporary) employment in labor-intense jobs particularly in
2 3One such possible real example is the case mentioned earlier of Serbs
in Northwest Bosnia who may have migrated to Central Serbia instead of
the equally attractive (economically) Central Croatia because the
former may have been considered more attractive once ethnic affinity
was added to the decision function.
2 4Dragomir Pantic, Etnidka Distanca U SFRJ (Belgrade: Institut Drustvenih
Nauka, 1967). This study attempts to measure the "ethnic-distance" among
different groups in Yugoslavia through sample surveys, posing questions
such as: for each ethnic group other than your own would you consent to
such a person living in your republic, working with you, being your super-
ior, being your friend, and the acid-test: marrying your daughter.
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the tertiary sector-- construction, snow removel, domestic odd jobs, mar-
ginal intracity cartage on bicycle or manpowered carts-- are much greater
than in less urbanized areas.
The explanation for the unimportance of the EA variable in Western.
Vojvodina is of a somewhat similar nature: though 50% of the population is
Serbian, there is a very large group of Hungarians in this area, comprising
about one-third of the region's population. They too are ethnically quite
far removed from the Slav groups in Yugoslavia, and though the region was
classified in this study as being Serbian, it included a large group who
may be relatively indifferent in their attitudes toward other ethnic
groups25 and perhaps also to the size of their own group outside this
region, as their numbers elsewhere are very small.
For the two Bosnian regions which have "not-significant" t-values
the reason is probably in the fact that both have a relatively heterogeneous
population ethnically. Northeast Bosnia, which lies across the Sava River
from the attractive fertile lands of Eastern Croatia (Slavonia) and Western
Vojvodina (Srem and Backa) has a population about one-half Serb and about
one-fifth each of Croats and Muslims. Hercegovina, a barren land for the
most part, is about one-half Croat and one-third Serb. Thus, even if the
individual groups were taking into account the ethnic affinity factor in
their decision to migrate, the lack of homogeneity is sufficiently great
that the simple test of the hypothesis used here may not have been able to
detect this factor. For all these heterogeneous cases, a more complete
2 5On the distance of Hungarians to others, see ibid.
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test should have included similar ethnic affinity measure for the second
and perhaps even third largest groups.
The very low value and nonsignificance of the EA coefficient
in the case of Old Serbia and Eastern Serbia are not so easy to rationalize
within the framework of the hypothesis. They are both extremely homogen-
eous, with the predominant Serbs accounting for 90% and 98% of the popula-
tion respectively. One might infer from this that the ethnic affinity
variable does not play as great a role as hypothesized in the case of
regions that are predominantly Serbian, and even though there still remains
the puzzle as to why this coefficient is insignificant in only two of the
four regions to Serbia Proper, such an implication appears to be supported
by the data on the coefficient values when arranged by the grouping of
regions comprising republics, shown in Table 8.
The data in Table 8 are arranged in order of the average value
for the EA coefficient, and although this is not intended to be proof of
the relative importance of this factor in migration among the different
republics (= ethnic groups where there is great homogeneity, that is, all
except Bosnia) there are some important facts to note in the data. First
of all, the ordering by averages is an excellent reflection of the values
covered by the ranges, a slight disturbance of this relation being found
in the case of Bosnia. Secondly, there appears to be a close clustering
of the values when the regions are grouped into their respective republics,
which suggests homogeneity in the effect among regions of the same ethnic
association. The latter in particular is a very significant point, as it
brings into sharp focus the systematic consistency of the results (and
consistency and conformance to a systematic relation, not only high R2
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Table 8
VALUES OF EA COEFFICIENT BY REPUBLIC GROUPS
RegionsRepublic
Kosmet
Range of Values
5
Central Serbia
Vojvodina
Bosnia
Croatia
Slovenia
Montenegro
Macedonia
1, 2, 3, 4
6, 7
14, 15, 16,
17, 18
8, 9, 10, 11
12, 13
0.02 - 0.18
0.15 - 0.27
0.22 - 0.50
0.19 - 0.47
0.34 - 0.48
20
19
Average
-0.03
0.11
0.21
0.30
0.31
0.41
0.41
0.51
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are important in an econometric (exercise). Third, if one leaves out the
values for Bosnia and the Kosmet for reasons mentioned earlier, the order-
ing of the average coefficient values is closely correlated to the absolute
size of the regions (= ethnic groups) which suggests the hypothesis: the
larger a group, the less it feels the need to consider ethnic factors as
a separate element in the migration decision.
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SUPPORTING EVIDENCE ON ETHNIC FACTOR: MIGRATION INTO BELGRADE
For the reader who remains somewhat skeptical of the indirect
evidence yielded by the statistical inference methodology, I present a
brief glance at some more direct evidence of the importance of the ethnic
factor. The city of Belgrade, unlike most other administrative units in
Yugoslavia, tabulates the information from the migrant registrations re-
quired of all individuals both on entering and leaving the city. This in-
formation, though unpublished, was obtained by the author from the city's
Statistical Office. It cross-classifies migrants according to several
characteristics, among which is ethnic affiliation. Thus it is possible
to identify the number of Croats who came from Macedonia, the number of
Serbs who came from Slovenia, etc.
Since Belgrade is predominantly a Serbian city,26 one testable
hypothesis for the importance of ethnic factors in migration would be that
for a given region, Serbs form a higher proportion of the migrants from
that region than of the population of that region. If the migration de-
cision were economic only, the ethnic composition of the migrants should
be about the same as the ethnic composition of the population.
Table 9 shows very clearly that this is far from being the case:
Serbs are very highly "overrepresented" among migrants from different
Republics, particularly strongly for Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Here then is a clear case of migration from non-Serbian to
2 6Eighty-five percent in 1961 (Jugoslavija, SZS, Popis Stanovnistva 1961,
Book VI, p. 303).
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Table 9
SERBIAN REPRESENTATION AMONG IN-MIGRANTS TO BELGRADE,
1964-1966 BY REPUBLIC OF ORIGIN
Republic
Percent of Serbs Among
In-Migrants from Given
Republic
(%)
Bosnia-Hercegovina
Montenegro
Croatia
Macedonia
Slovenia
Central Serbia
Vojvodina
Kosovo
82.4
19.4
70.7
27.7
50.6
92.5
79.1
57.0
Percent of Serbs in
Population of Given
Republic
(%)
33.1
2.9
15.0
3.1
0.8
93.1
65.3
23.5
Source: Belgrade data (unpublished) obtained by author directly from City of
Belgrade Statistical Office. For the percentage of Serbs in the
Republic, see R. Petrovic', "The Numerical Strength and Territorial
Distribution of the Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia," Yugoslav
Survey, 12:1 (February 1971), p. 3.
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Serbian areas involving largely Serbs, hypothesized earlier as a
possibility for such regions as Northwest Bosnia. It appears from the
data of Table 9, that there is a selectivity hypothesis to be made for
Yugoslavia: the migration process "selects" among the different ethnic
groups, at least in determining the pattern of flows.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
1. Interregional migration in Yugoslavia has been quite large,
and increasing over time up to 1961.
2. Generally the flow has been from poor areas to rich areas,
from the South to the North, but much less has gone to the richest republics
Slovenia and Croatia in the West than might have been expected on the basis
of economic considerations.
3. Until 1961 there is an important distinction to be made be-
tween migration flows of a rural-urban nature and those of a rural-rural
type. The former are the usual industry-oriented flows toward the important
urban-industrial (and/or commercial) centers such as Belgrade, Zagreb,
Ljubljana, Sarajevo, and Skoplje among older ones, and Smederevo, Nis,
Maribor, Rijeka, Split, Zenica, and Titograd among the newer ones. The
latter are flows from poor lands to fertile lands in the Pannonian Plain
north of the Sava-Danube line.
4. A regression analysis of a push-pull model of migration shows
that Yugoslav migration has responded to the traditional economic factors--
income, distance, urbanization, new opportunities-- in much the same way as
has been the case elsewhere.
5. However, in addition to the usual economic factors, a more
complete understanding of Yugoslav migration patterns and their determinants
require the inclusion of the ethnic factor. People apparently consider the
ethnocultural climate of a region as one of several important attributes
relevant to the choice of migration destination. The importance of the
ethnic factor is manifested both in multiple regression analysis and in the
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evidence of "selectivity" of Serb migrants from non-Serb regions into the
Serbian city of Belgrade.
6. Finally, there is some indication that the ethnic factor is
not equally important for all groups, that in fact the larger the ethnic
group, the less importance it attaches to this factor in making decisions
to migrate.
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